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Olivia Partlow
The Abduction of Japanese Latin Americans
during World War II
The United States has a reputation for being prejudiced towards
new groups of immigrants. In the past we saw that when nonEnglish, Catholics, people of Asian descent and other groups
began immigrating in large numbers. Today we see it with the
large influx of Hispanic immigrants. From the 1920s through
1940s this prejudice was directed at Japanese immigrants. There
were laws in place that prevented Japanese immigrants from
becoming citizens. The United States was not the only country to
have laws against Japanese nationals. Several Latin American
countries had similar laws. Peru had a very large population of
Japanese immigrants and in turn had the most prejudice. The
United States took this prejudice to the next level by interning
people of Japanese ancestry residing on both United States and
Latin American soil. The United States was able to intern Axis
nationals from Latin American countries by using outdated laws
and finding loopholes in current ones.
When World War II broke out in Europe, the United States
began planning for the internment of its Japanese population. The
United States also enlisted several Latin American countries to
arrest their people of Japanese as well as German and Italian
descent and bring them to America to be interned. The United
States planned the internment even though the Munson Report
found that Japanese Americans were very patriotic and eager to
show their support of America. Curtis B. Munson, a private
citizen, was hired by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR)
to lead an investigation of the loyalty of Japanese Americans that
resulted in the Munson Report.1 Munson recommended that
internment was unnecessary, but that recommendation did not
stop FDR from ordering it.2 The United States planned to
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exchange the Japanese Latin Americans with Allied soldiers being
held by Axis countries.3
The Alien Enemies Act of 1798 gave FDR the power to
intern “alien enemies.” The original Alien Enemies Act of 1798
was created by a Federalist controlled congress as an attempt to
quiet the Democratic-Republican opposition as well as protecting
against possible French sympathizers during a time when a war
with France seemed imminent.4 During World War II this law was
abused by FDR. The Latin American countries cooperating in the
kidnapping and deportation of Axis nationals arrested and
confiscated the passports of these people. Once they were
deported to the United States, the United States government used
the Alien Enemies Act of 1798 as a way to legally hold the poor
deportees because they could not provide their passports.5
Although the Alien Enemies Act was outdated in 1941, that was
not the first time it was abused in the twentieth century.
During World War I the United States interned Germans
and German Americans suspected in sabotage and did so using
the Alien Enemies Act. The internment during World War I
served as a precedent for the large-scale internment of Japanese
nationals during World War II. The United States worked with
several Latin American countries, especially Panama and Cuba,
who collaborated by interning Germans living on their soils.6
Latin American countries cooperated with the war and internment
efforts because they were within the United States’ sphere of
influence and many of their economies depended on continued
support from the United States. This carried through to World
War II. The Charge in Bolivia wrote to Secretary of State Cordell
Hull about their support of the United States and added, “Public
opinion is mostly with us on our feeling, is superficial and based
largely on the fact of Bolivian economic dependence on the United
States.”7 The efforts made by the Latin American countries during
World War I made the United States confident of continued
cooperation during the time leading up to and during World War
II.
The Eighth International Conference of American States
held in Lima, Peru in 1938 discussed the possible attack on a
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neutral American country. This conference took place three years
before the attack on Pearl Harbor and the United States’ entrance
into World War II. The foreign ministers of the American States
attended it and decided that the member states would consult
each other if there were to be a threat to a neutral American
country. Also concluded at Lima was that enemy aliens would be
subject to the authority of the country in which they reside.8
Although this was before war broke out in Europe, the decisions
made in 1938 laid the foundation for the wartime policies of the
United States and the Latin American countries toward their
residents of Japanese ancestry.
The following year, with the outbreak of war in Europe, all
twenty-one foreign ministers of the American states met in
Panama to discuss their previous conferences on American
neutrality. The Inter-American Neutrality Committee was
established at this time. The purpose of this committee was to
provide legal advice to the states in the region so that they could
stay out of world conflicts. The committee would later go on to set
up the guidelines for internment.9 Also during the meeting in
Panama, a security zone was set up around the American
continent. The security zone was created so that warships could
not come close to American soil. Axis ships that entered the
security zone would be subject to search.10
While Latin American states prepared to stay neutral
during the war, the FBI, under President Roosevelt’s orders, began
collecting intelligence on Axis nationals both in the United States
and in Latin America beginning in 1939. The United States set up
agencies throughout Latin America to monitor Japanese,
Germans, and Italians that could become security threats. During
this time the FBI concentrated mostly on those Axis nationals that
posed a threat. However, after the attack on Pearl Harbor the
qualifications of a subversive quickly changed to include all those
of Japanese ancestry and those of German or Italian ancestry who
were suspected of fifth column activity. The United States was
able to convince several Latin American countries and territories,
namely Peru and Panama, to collect intelligence on their people as
well.11
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Foreign ministers met again at Havana, Cuba in 1940 to
discuss the continued neutrality, but also the possibilities of action
in the event of a non-American country’s hostility towards an
American country. The declaration following the meeting stated,
“That any attempt on the part of a non-American state against the
integrity or inviolability of the territory, the sovereignty or the
political independence of an American state shall be considered as
an act of aggression against the states which sign this
declaration.”12 It was this declaration that led most American
states to declare war on Japan following the Pearl Harbor
bombing.
The Inter-American Neutrality committee, created at the
1939 meeting of Foreign Ministers at Lima, met in 1940. At this
meeting the Committee outlined internment as follows:
The neutral State will intern in its territory, until
the termination of the war, all individuals
belonging to the land, sea or air forces of the
belligerents, who individually or collectively enter
its territory, as well as all officers and crews of
warships, military airplanes and ships considered
auxiliary vessels of war, in all cases in which the
interning of the said ships and airplanes is
appropriate.13
It is this meeting that established how the internment process
would take place. At this time it was understood that each
country would intern its population on its own soil, with the
United States footing the bill, but that was soon changed because
it became too costly. The plan was later modified so that the
United States would house all the internees.
A month and a half before Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor,
the U.S. Ambassador to Panama, Edwin C. Wilson negotiated
Panamanian internment. According to this agreement, as soon as
the United States acted, Panama would arrest and intern Japanese
individuals on Panamanian soil. Panamanian guards would guard
internees on Tobago Island, with the United States paying all
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costs. The United States would also take any and all blame against
negative claims, should they arise.14 The United States was very
concerned with the Axis nationals living in Panama because of the
security risk of the Panama Canal. Both the United States and the
Panamanian governments believed that the Panama Canal could
be a target.
On December 7, 1941, the Imperial Army of Japan attacked
the United States naval base at Pearl Harbor. Immediately after
the attack Latin American countries began writing to FDR and
Secretary of State Cordell Hull. Almost every country in the
Americas declared war on Japan following the United States, in
accordance with the decisions made at the 1940 Havana
Conference. Most Latin American states declared their support for
the United States in the days following the attack.
On December 8, the Chargé in Mexico, McGurk, wrote to
Hull and assured him that, “according to our informant all
Japanese subjects will be interned and the Japanese Minister will
be handed his passports.”15 Mexico was different from the other
Latin American countries because it chose to intern its Japanese
subjects on its own soil instead of in the United States. Also on
December 8, the United States ambassador to Panama, Wilson,
sent a telegram to Hull notifying him that the internment of
Japanese nationals around the Panama Canal as well as
censorship of radio and other communications had already
began.16 Panama was the first to cut diplomatic relations with
Japan, declare war and begin to intern Axis nationals. As a United
States territory that held the Panama Canal, Panama was vital to
the United States’ internment policy.
Many countries arrested and detained Axis nationals but it
was not until a Conference of Foreign Ministers of the American
Republics at Rio de Janeiro in January 1942, that it was decided
that the enemy aliens would be sent to the United States for
internment. This decision was made because the cost would be too
high for the United States to set up internment camps throughout
Latin America rather than internment in a concentrated area in the
United States.17 Plans for internment within the United States
made it easier for the United States diplomats to convince the
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Latin American states to participate in internment. Also decided
at the Rio de Janeiro conference was that the United States would
provide security to the hemisphere by moving troops into Latin
America as well as providing financial support through Lend
Lease programs.18
Ecuador required convincing to begin interning its alien
enemies. In a telegram to Cordell Hull, Minister Long conveyed
Ecuador’s concerns regarding internment plans:
The President and Foreign Minister asked me to join them
this afternoon and indicated they were exploring future
possibilities. There are in Ecuador about 25 Japanese plus
and active chargé d’Affaires. If Ecuador should declare
war or even take some lesser step that might involve the
Japanese in a concentration camp it is their feeling that
Japan might endeavor to seize the Galápagos as a base
which Ecuador is unable to prevent. Thus with the
intention of helping us by interning the Japanese Ecuador
might actually furnish Japan a pretext to seize the
Galápagos. Is there anything that I can suggest in this
connection?19
On December 10th Hull responded to Long letting him know that
the United States did not believe the Galápagos were in danger
whatsoever while stressing the importance of internment.20 A day
earlier, the Undersecretary of State, Welles, sent out a
memorandum of his correspondence with the Ecuadorian
government. Ecuador would be open to complying with all its
inter-American agreements if an agreement of protection could be
reached with the United States.21 Following this agreement
Ecuador arrested its Japanese residents and sent them to the
United States to be interned.
Peru followed a rather different course of action than
Ecuador in dealing with its population of Japanese descent. There
had been anti-Japanese sentiment in Peru ever since a large influx
of Japanese immigrants began arriving during the earlier half of
the nineteenth century.22 Peru also had anti-Japanese laws before
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the internment process began and had cut off immigration from
Japan in 1936.23 Peru saw the United States proposition as an easy
way to rid itself of its Japanese population, the largest in all of
Latin America. Eighty percent of all Latin American internees
came from Peru. In 1942 undersecretary Welles estimated 1,053
out of 1,747 total would come from Peru.24 Peru also received a
$29 million Lend Lease for their collaboration during the war.25
Officials in Peru had already decided to break diplomatic
relations, declare war on Japan, and intern its Japanese population
immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor. This was fueled
mostly from anti-Japanese resentment due to their success in
business and the cotton industry in Peru.26
The United States and the Latin American countries
involved used deceitful practices to “legally” hold Axis nationals
in the United States. Once arrested and detained in their countries
of residence, the enemy aliens had their passports seized. Then
they were loaded onto ships to be brought to the United States.
The first shipment of 325 enemy nationals came aboard the Etolin
on April 5, 1942. 141 of the deportees were Peruvian Japanese, the
others of German and Italian decent. Of the 141 Japanese
detained, there was not one that had an arrest record and only
seven were on the Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked Nationals.27
In the months and years following the first shipment, many
women and children were either forcibly or voluntarily (in order
to reunite with family members) interned. Once the deportees
arrived in the United States, officials would ask for their passports
and when no one was able to produce them, they were taken to
camps to be interned.
Most internment camps for Japanese Latin Americans
were located in Texas in places that previously housed Civilian
Conservation Core (CCC) camps or other similar structures. The
Kennedy camp in Kennedy, Texas housed the first internees from
the Etolin. Like other camps, barbed wire fences and guard towers
surrounded the Kennedy Camp. Internees were forced to do a
daily line-up when a siren sounded at 9 A.M. Military personnel
also heavily guarded them. During an inspection of the camp it
was found out that the internees were refused ice water during
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the scorching summer when temperatures rose to 100° F. After
this startling inspection a new director was placed in charge of the
camp.28
Unlike the many Japanese Americans that were sent to
internment camps, many of the Japanese Latin Americans were
deported back to Japan in exchange for Allied nationals in Axis
controlled countries. The first trade happened in the spring of
1942 and mostly consisted of Japanese officials in exchange for
United States officials.29 Most internees wished to return to Japan
once they arrived in the United States. Some were forcibly
deported back to Japan as part of an exchange and many
voluntarily repatriated after the war was over.30 In a 1945
Presidential Proclamation, Harry S. Truman ordered, all alien
enemies be “[removed] to destinations outside the limits of the
Western Hemisphere in territory of the enemy governments to
which or to the principles of which they have adhered.”31 This
forced many Japanese Latin Americans to return to Japan. Once
the war and internment was over, Peru refused to let Japanese
Peruvians return. These Peruvians either stayed in the United
States or returned to Japan upon the termination of internment.
Decades after internment, Japanese Americans sought
redress for the atrocities committed against them during World
War II. The Civil Liberties Act of 1988 apologized to Japanese
Americans who had been interned and offered $20,000 to “eligible
individuals.”32 Japanese Latin Americans were not considered
eligible. Frustrated by the injustice, four Japanese Latin Americans
brought a class action lawsuit against the United States. The
United States settled and allotted $5,000 for each survivor and
President Bill Clinton offered a public apology.33 The United
States argued that the Japanese Latin Americans were not eligible
for the full redress because they were technically illegal aliens.
The United States Government abusing its power as a
world leader as well as abusing its very own laws rendered the
internment of Japanese Latin Americans possible. The United
States blatantly disregarded reports, such as the one from Curtis
Munson, that there was no need for internment. Most of the
Japanese Latin Americans that were interned had never been in
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trouble with the law and were selected because of the antiJapanese sentiment in their region. Besides acting on prejudices,
the United States used outdated laws to justify the kidnapping of
roughly 2500 people. Rather than acting as a response to the attack
on Pearl Harbor, preparations for the internment of Japanese
started well before December of 1941. Some laws and agreements
used to justify it were concluded before the war even began in
Europe. This was an outrageous abuse of power that
unfortunately went unchecked for years and to this day has not
been fully discussed.
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